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Abstract
This paper shows that uninsured risk and borrowing constraints can make an individual￿ s
marginal propensity to consume negatively dependent on his/her permanent income. Therefore,
higher income growth can lead to higher saving rates without requiring (or causing) high interest
rates ￿ in sharp contrast to implications of the permanent income hypothesis. For example,
the model predicts that household saving ratio can rise from 5% to 25% when the annual rate of
income growth increases from 1% to 10%, despite a ￿xed 1% real deposit rate. The predictions
are consistent with the experience of emerging economies, such as Japan (in the 1950-70s) and
China (over the past 30 years).
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11 Introduction
The canonical permanent income hypothesis (PIH)1 predicts that forward-looking consumers should
save less when income growth is high because they expect to be richer in the future than they are
today. Accordingly, saving rates should be lower in fast-growing countries than in slow-growing
countries.
This prediction has led to the well-known "high saving rate" puzzle for fast-developing economies
(such as Japan in the 1950-70s and China in the past 30 years). Much e⁄ort has been devoted to
resolving this puzzle without reaching a consensus. For example, Horioka (1985, 1990) provides
a comprehensive list of various life-cycle factors that may contribute to Japan￿ s high saving rate,
including precautionary saving, housing ￿nance, and income growth. However, careful analysis of
the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis leads Hayashi (1986) to reject it as a plausible theory of
Japan￿ s saving behavior. In particular, Hayashi concludes that high income growth cannot explain
Japan￿ s high saving rate because the life-cycle hypothesis depends on heterogeneous cohort e⁄ects
to generate the positive link between growth and aggregate saving, but such cohort e⁄ects are
inconsistent with Japanese data.
Yet, empirical evidence suggests that saving and growth are strongly positively correlated,
and the positive correlation holds largely because high growth leads to high saving, not vice versa.2
Nonetheless, most theoretical e⁄ort has been devoted to understanding the growth-to-saving causal-
ity in a life-cycle framework, because it is thought that this fact is inconsistent with optimal con-
sumption behavior in an in￿nite-horizon permanent-income framework.
A leading alternative view is that the PIH fails because it is based on, among other things,
the assumption of exogenous rates of returns to ￿nancial assets (i.e., the real interest rate). In a
production economy with productive assets (such as capital), the real rates of return are determined
by the marginal products of such assets. When asset returns are so determined, they will respond to
changes in productivity growth, which is the fundamental source of changes in permanent income.
A permanent increase in total factor productivity (TFP) raises the rate of return to capital, so
investment demand will increase, resulting in a higher equilibrium saving rate through a higher real
interest rate. Consequently, in contrast to the prediction of the PIH, standard general-equilibrium
growth theory suggests that household saving may increase rather than decrease in response to
a higher permanent income (as implied by the analysis of Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu,
2006).
1Friedman (1957).
2See, e.g., Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) and the references therein.
2However, fast-growing economies tend to have not only high saving rates, but also low and
essentially ￿xed interest rates. For example, in Japan in the 1950-70s, the household saving rate
was as high as 23%, while the real 3-month time deposit rate was negative for the entire period.3
Similarly, in China over the past 30 years, the average personal saving rate has been about 25%,
yet the real 1-year deposit rate has been below zero.4 Hence, the puzzle is not just why high growth
can lead to high saving (or vice versa), but also why a high saving rate is possible when the interest
rate is so low.5
This paper argues that su¢ ciently large uninsured uncertainty and borrowing constraints may
hold the key for understanding the triple phenomena of "high saving, high growth, and low in-
terest rate" for fast-growing countries. That households are subject to borrowing constraints and
uninsured idiosyncratic risk has been extensively documented and studied in the literature for devel-
oped countries (see, e.g., Aiyagari, 1994, and Gross and Souleles, 2002, and the references therein).
Agents in developing countries are typically far more borrowing constrained and far less insured for
idiosyncratic shocks than those in developed countries, because of the lack of social safety nets and
under-developed ￿nancial and insurance markets. Skinner (1986) presents empirical evidence that
income uncertainty is a key factor determining households￿precautionary savings in developing
countries.
Precautionary saving under borrowing constraints can completely alter the relationship between
permanent income and consumption by making the marginal propensity to save a positive function
of permanent labor income, so that faster income growth generates an increased propensity to save
regardless of interest rates. As a result, high growth can lead to high saving without requiring
or causing high interest rates. In other words, even if the deposit rate is ￿xed at zero, household
saving may still be excessively high and respond positively to income growth.6 For the same
reason, borrowing constraints can support a large spread between the deposit rate and the rate of
return to capital in general equilibrium. Consequently, fast-growing economies may appear to have
undiminished high rates of return to capital despite a high investment-to-output ratio.7
3An extensive literature argues that the Japanese government repressed interest rates in that period to promote
investment and stimulate growth (see, e.g., Horiuchi, 1984; Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976). Dekle (1993) and Homer
and Sylla (2005) also note that real interest rates were never particularly high in Japan, but were higher in the
low-saving, low-growth 1920s than in the high-saving, high-growth 1960s. Although the rates of return on corporate
equities were very high in Japan during that period, households￿share of equities was quite low (see, e.g., Horioka,
1990).
4The fact that the real interest rates in China have been kept very low since the economic reform is well known
(see, e.g., Zou and Sun, 1996). Because households￿access to ￿nancial markets and investment opportunities are
typically very limited and stockmarket is extremely risky, deposits have been the major means of saving and the most
important contributor to China￿ s aggregate saving ratio despite the low interest rates (see, e.g., Kraay, 2000).
5As a reference point, in the standard neoclassical growth model presented in the next section, when the rate of
income growth reaches 10% per year, the aggregate saving rate can reach about 20%. However, to support this high
saving rate, the real interest rate must be about 15%.
6This would not be the case without uninsured risk and borrowing constraints. In a standard growth model, the
saving rate would decrease with income growth if the interest rate were constant, as predicted by the PIH.
7For example, the real rate of return to capital has been over 20% a year for the past 30 years in China, and it
has shown little sign of diminishing despite the 40% investment-to-output ratio (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian, 2006).
3The main intuition is that uninsured risk and borrowing constraints induce precautionary sav-
ings, even if the interest rate is low (imagine why rational agents hold inventories despite negative
rates of return ￿ because inventories yield a liquidity premium). If the degree of uncertainty re-
mains constant relative to the income trend, agents would want to maintain a stable stock of savings
relative to trend because of the need for self-insurance; namely, they prefer to maintain a constant
bu⁄er stock to income ratio along a balanced growth path. Since income is a ￿ ow, when it grows,
a larger portion of the ￿ ow must be devoted to the accumulation of the stock ("investment"); oth-
erwise, the stock-to-￿ ow ratio would decline sharply, which would hinder the bu⁄er-stock function
of savings and reduce the extent of self-insurance. Thus, the saving rate should rise with income
growth. In other words, the e⁄ective rate of return to saving is the real interest rate compounded
by a liquidity premium. When the growth rate of income rises, the liquidity premium increases
if the saving stock falls relative to the income trend. A higher liquidity premium thus induces a
higher saving rate.8 Therefore, the predictions of the canonical PIH are completely altered: High
growth leads to high saving, even with low (and ￿xed) interest rates.
These arguments are formalized in this paper in an in￿nite-horizon neoclassical growth model
(with or without capital), where long-run income growth is driven by exogenous TFP changes
and households face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks and are borrowing constrained. To facilitate
the analysis, some simplifying assumptions are necessary to make the model analytically tractable.
When markets are incomplete and agents are heterogeneous, analytical tractability not only reduces
the computational costs of comparative analysis, but also makes the mechanisms transparent.9 The
key simplifying assumptions include (i) The utility function is quasi-linear.10 (ii) Labor supply
decisions of all households must be made before observing their idiosyncratic shocks in each period.
The second assumption implies that a spot labor market does not always exist and it ensures the
bu⁄er-stock function of savings ￿ otherwise, current wage income can be adjusted immediately to
fully bu⁄er any shocks to income or preferences within the same period.11 In addition, we need
to place the idiosyncratic shocks on preferences or gross wealth instead of labor earnings.12 Under
these assumptions, the optimal growth model with borrowing constraints has closed-form solutions
8However, to keep the stock-to-￿ ow ratio exactly constant as income grows faster is very costly ￿ the opportunity
cost of not consuming the rising income increases with income growth. Hence, although the saving rate may increase,
it may not increase enough to achieve the original stock-to-￿ ow ratio. So in a new steady state with a higher growth
rate, the optimal stock-to-￿ ow ratio is lower than before despite a higher saving rate. This means that the liquidity
premium increases by just enough to balance the marginal costs of saving and the marginal bene￿ts of saving.
9Given that our results are in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom and may appear to be counterintuitive,
closed-form solutions are preferred to numerical results.
10Although this assumption implies an in￿nitely elastic labor supply, it is nonetheless realistic for developing
economies such as China ￿ the large rural population in provides an abundant supply of labor.
11This assumption is not needed if labor supply is inelastic or the leisure function is nonlinear, but then the model
becomes analytically intractable.
12Even with quasi-linear preferences, the model is not analytically tractable if the idiosyncratic shocks come directly
from labor income (see, e.g., Imrohoroglu, 1989; Zeldes, 1989; Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 2001; Aiyagari, 1994; Krusell
and Smith, 1998).
4for individuals￿optimal consumption and saving plans. Aggregating by the law of large numbers,
the general equilibrium of the model can be solved by standard methods in the representative-agent
real business cycle (RBC) literature, and dynamic impulse responses of aggregate savings to both
transitory and permanent changes in the growth rate of TFP (the source of permanent income)
can be easily analyzed.
An important property of the model is that it reduces to a representative-agent, frictionless
neoclassical growth model with aggregate uncertainty when the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
becomes degenerate. This property makes the model easily comparable to standard growth models
by changing the parameter values that control the strength of precautionary saving and borrowing
constraints.13
This paper is closely related to those by Jappelli and Pagano (1994), Carroll, Overland, and
Weil (2000), and Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006). Jappelli and Pagano (1994) study
the relationships between saving and growth under borrowing constraints in a simple overlapping-
generations model. They show that borrowing constraints can enhance the positive e⁄ect of growth
on saving. However, as pointed out by Modigliani (1970), Hayashi (1986), and many others,
in life-cycle models the positive e⁄ect of growth on saving is largely the result of aggregation.
To the extent that the economy is growing, workers￿ savings will increase relative to retirees￿
dissavings, thus, measured aggregate savings will increase. In contrast, this paper studies the issue
in an in￿nite-horizon growth model in which the positive growth-to-saving e⁄ect originates from a
di⁄erent mechanism. That borrowing constraints can increase precautionary saving at a given level
of income growth is well known, but whether borrowing constraints can also generate a positive
causal e⁄ect of growth on saving in an in￿nite-horizon permanent-income framework is unclear. In
this regards, this paper complements the analysis of Jappelli and Pagano (1994).14
Alternatively, Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000) use an in￿nite-horizon endogenous-growth
model with habit formation to explain the positive e⁄ect of growth on saving. Habit formation can
generate a positive growth-to-saving e⁄ect because it makes consumption "sticky"; consequently,
an increase in permanent income will raise saving ￿rst before it has a full impact on consumption.
However, in this endogenous-growth model, high growth necessarily implies a high real interest
rate, which is inconsistent with the experience of Japan and China. Also, Chamon and Prasad￿ s
(2009) empirical analysis based on Chinese household data does not support habit formation as a
plausible explanation for China￿ s high household saving rates.
13The solution techniques applied in this paper are similar to those in Wen (2009).
14The idea that borrowing constraints can lead to excessive saving and can be a possible source of failures of
the PIH is hardly new. For example, see Zeldes (1989), Imrohoroglu (1989), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992, 1997),
Aiyagari (1994), and Huggett (1997), among many others. However, the implications of borrowing constraints for the
aggregate relationship between saving and growth have not previously been examined in a rigorous in￿nite-horizon
growth model, to the best of my knowledge. In addition, none of the above-cited works provides closed-form saving
functions under borrowing constraints in an in￿nite-horizon model as is done in this paper.
5More recently, Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006) use a standard neoclassical growth
model to o⁄er a quantitative account of the time path of Japan￿ s saving rate in the postwar period.
Their simulations, based on actual time-series data and the assumption of perfect foresight, reveal
that stochastic TFP growth is the main force driving Japan￿ s saving rate. But their model also
requires high interest rates to induce high saving rates and they do not address the low interest
rate issue.
This paper also has implications for global imbalances and global savings glut. If fast-growing
economies opt to save excessively more because of higher income growth and less developed ￿nancial
markets, it is then natural to observe out￿ ows of savings from these economies toward developed
countries where the interest rates are high, and in￿ ows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from
developed countries toward these emerging economies with faster TFP growth and high marginal
products of ￿xed capital. In this regard, this paper is also closely related to the work of Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Ju and Wei (2006), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), and
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2009). These papers all emphasize ine¢ cient ￿nancial system in
emerging economies as the key contributing factor to their ￿nancial capital out￿ ows. However, none
of these papers aims at explaining why high growth can lead to high saving despite low interest
rates.15
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives closed-
form decision rules for household consumption and saving. Section 3 studies the general-equilibrium
e⁄ects of growth and borrowing constraints on saving behavior along balanced growth paths. Sec-
tion 4 studies the transitional and short-run dynamics of the aggregate saving rate. Section 5
reconsiders the growth-to-saving e⁄ects in a counterfactual experiment with a ￿xed deposit rate.
Section 6 shows that the predictions of the model are consistent with the experience of China
and Japan during their high-growth periods. Section 7 concludes the paper with remarks for fu-




There are a continuum of households indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Taking as given the market real
interest rate rt, real wage Wt, and pro￿t income Vt from ￿rms, household i chooses sequences of
consumption Ct(i), savings St+1(i), and labor supply Nt(i) to maximize expected lifetime utility,
E
P1
t=0 ￿t flogCt(i) ￿ aNt(i)g, subject to the budget constraint Ct(i) + St+1(i) ￿ ["t(i) + ￿]Xt(i),
15Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2009) explain China￿ s high growth rate while taking as given its high saving
rate. This paper complements their analysis by o⁄ering an explanation of China￿ s high saving rate.
6where Xt(i) ￿ [(1 + rt)St(i) + WtNt(i) + Vt] denotes household i￿ s wealth income or cash in hand,16
which includes initial wealth, (1+r)St(i), labor income, WtNt(i), and any lump-sum transfers such
as ￿rms￿pro￿t income Vt. Households are borrowing constrained, so we impose St+1(i) ￿ 0 in each
period following the standard literature. The log form of the utility function ensures the existence
of a balanced growth path.17
Note that cash in hand is subject to a multiplicative idiosyncratic shock, ￿+"t(i), where ￿ 2 (0;1)
is a constant multiplier, and "t(i) is i.i.d. with mean E"(i) = 1 ￿ ￿. This implies that ￿ fraction
of the wealth income is never subject to idiosyncratic shocks. The expected value of the shock is
normalized to E"(i) = 1￿￿ so that the average value of ￿+"(i) equals 1; thus, idiosyncratic shocks
do not cause distortions to the budget constraint on average or at the aggregate level.18 The model
reduces to a representative-agent model either if ￿ = 1 or the variance of "t(i) becomes zero.19
An interpretation of the wealth-income shock is disaster risk: Nature randomly destroys a
portion of household wealth in each period. Since disaster risk is not fully self-insurable, the
model can be easily calibrated to match the wealth inequality in the data if ￿ is small enough,
even though "(i) is i.i.d.20 This type of shocks helps to capture the severity of idiosyncratic
risk in developing countries (such as tra¢ c and various types of accidents, natural and social-
political disasters, robbery, unemployment, illness, erratic changes in the value of wealth, and so
on). However, with respect to the main results of the paper, this assumption is innocuous ￿ it
is mainly a technical device to obtain closed-form solutions because it is well known that with
CRRA utility functions, an in￿nite-horizon consumption model with borrowing constraints is not
analytically tractable if the idiosyncratic risk derives directly and solely from labor income. The
model is also tractable if the idiosyncratic shocks are placed on preferences instead of cash in hand
(see Wen, 2009) and the main results of the paper remain intact, which is reassuring since it suggests
that the key mechanisms uncovered in this paper are robust to the assumptions of the sources of
idiosyncratic risks.21
16In this paper, "wealth income" and "cash in hand" are used interchangeably.
17The Appendix shows that the qualitative results do not hinge on the log form of the utility function.
18The multiplicative assumption of individual wealth-income shocks implies that the degree of risk remains constant
relative to the balanced growth path and does not diminish with growth ￿ namely, wealth inequality remains stable
as the economy grows. This implication is consistent with empirical evidence (see, e.g., Wol⁄, 1998). The same
assumption is made in the literature of incomplete markets where idiosyncratic earning (or labor productivity) shocks
are multiplicative to the real wage, suggesting that the degree of income uncertainty does not diminish as the real
wage grows over time (see, e.g., Aiyagari, 1994). Still, without economic analysis, such assumptions do not indicate
whether the saving rate should increase or decrease with growth. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to assume that
the idiosyncratic shocks are additive to wealth or income, which would imply that as wealth or income grow over
time the signi￿cance of such shocks diminishes to zero.
19When ￿ ! 1, the distribution of "(i) becomes a degenerate delta function with a unit mass centered at 0.
20Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998) show that idiosyncratic risk stemming from labor income alone
cannot generate enough inequality across households to explain the wealth distribution in the United States because
such shocks are almost fully self-insurable unless they are highly persistent.
21The point made in this paper is more general than it may appear under the speci￿c assumptions of the stylized
model, since (i) the source of the uninsured idiosyncratic risk is irrelevant, (ii) agents always need to accumulate
a bu⁄er stock of savings, and (iii) they want to maintain a stable stock-to-￿ ow ratio on the balanced growth path.
7The information structure and sequence of events are as follows. Within each time period t,
there are two subperiods. All aggregate shocks are realized in the beginning of the ￿rst subpe-
riod but the idiosyncratic shocks are realized only in the second subperiod. In the ￿rst subperiod,
households choose labor supply Nt(i) after observing period-t aggregate shocks but without ob-
serving the idiosyncratic wealth-income shocks. In the second subperiod, the idiosyncratic shocks
"t(i) are realized and households then choose consumption and savings to maximize expected life-
time utilities.22 Without loss of generality, assume a = 1. The population is constant over time.
Idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to any aggregate shocks.
2.2 Firms
There is a unit mass of identical ￿rms producing output (Yt) according to the technology, Yt =
K￿
t (ZtNt)
1￿￿, where Zt denotes a nonstationary process of labor-augmenting technology, which
grows over time according to the process Zt = (1 + gt)Zt￿1. The capital stock (K) is accumulated
according to Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt +It, where I is investment per ￿rm. The stochastic growth rate gt
has mean ￿ g ￿ 0 and follows the law of motion:
gt ￿ ￿ g = ￿g (gt￿1 ￿ ￿ g) + ￿t; (1)
where ￿g ￿ 0 measures the persistence of the aggregate growth shock and the innovation ￿t is i.i.d
with zero mean. When ￿ g = 0 and ￿g = 0, the dynamic e⁄ects of Zt are identical to a random-walk
technology shock without drift. With a little abuse of language, we use the terms "technology"
and "TFP" interchangeably, although Zt re￿ ects labor-augmenting technology. We assume the
existence of capital rental markets, as in Aiyagari (1994). Firms behave competitively; hence,
the real factor prices are determined by their respective marginal products: Wt = (1 ￿ ￿) Yt
Nt and
rt + ￿ = ￿ Yt
Kt, where r + ￿ is the user￿ s cost of capital with capital depreciation ￿ 2 [0;1]. Because
of constant returns to scale, the pro￿t income is zero, Vt = 0.
2.3 Transformation
The model is not stationary in the level but is stationary in the growth rate. In the absence of
aggregate uncertainty (i.e., gt = ￿ g for all t), the aggregate economy has a unique balanced growth
path along which the real interest rate and aggregate hours worked, N ￿
R
N(i)di, are constant,




S(i)di, Kt+1, Yt, and Wt all
Therefore, the liquidity premium of the bu⁄er stock must rise whenever the stock-to-￿ ow ratio declines, which will
trigger a higher saving rate.
22This timing structure implies that households may not be able to fully self-insure against idiosyncratic risk by
adjusting labor income despite perfectly elastic labor supply.
8grow at the same rate ￿ g. Hence, to solve for the competitive equilibrium, we can transform the
model into a stationary one by scaling it down by the growth factor (1 + ￿ g)
￿t. Using lowercase
letters to denote the transformed variables (e.g., yt ￿ Yt
(1+￿ g)t),23 the production function and the












respectively. Other relationships such as the capital accumulation equation can be transformed
analogously.
















ct(i) + (1 + ￿ g)st+1(i) ￿ ["t(i) + ￿]xt(i) (6)
st+1(i) ￿ 0; (7)
where
xt(i) ￿ (1 + rt)st(i) + wtNt(i) + vt (8)
de￿nes the transformed cash in hand net of the idiosyncratic multiplier, and the expectation oper-
ator ~ Et in the objective function denotes expectations conditional on the information set of time
t excluding "t(i), and the operator Et denotes expectations based on the full information set in
period t including "t(i). These notations re￿ ect the information and timing structure of the model.
The idiosyncratic i.i.d. shock has support " 2 [0;"max], cumulative distribution function F("), and
the unconditional mean
R
"dF = 1 ￿ ￿. The mean requirement implies "max > 1 ￿ ￿.
2.3.1 Decision Rules
Denoting f￿(i);￿(i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (6) and (7), respectively, the




23To obtain the equilibrium path of the untransformed variables, we can apply the inverse transformation, such as
Yt = (1 + ￿ g)
t yt and
Yt
Yt￿1 = (1 + ￿ g)
yt
yt￿1.
91 = wt ~ Et f["t(i) + ￿]￿t(i)g = wt
Z
["t(i) + ￿]￿t(i)dF(") (10)
(1 + ￿ g)￿t(i) = ￿Et f(1 + rt+1)["t+1(i) + ￿]￿t+1(i)g + ￿t(i); (11)
where equation (10) re￿ ects the fact that labor supply Nt(i) is determined before "t(i) (and hence
the value of ￿t(i)) is realized. By the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption
of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, equation (11) can be written as










where the ￿rst equality applies the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption,
and the second equality uses equation (10).
The optimal consumption and saving plans of each individual are characterized by a cuto⁄
strategy, where the cuto⁄ ("￿
t) is related to the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. We assume
interior solutions for labor supply and use a guess-and-verify strategy to derive the decision rules.
A key step in the analysis is to show that the cuto⁄ "￿
t, as well as the optimal cash in hand xt, are
independent of i.










t + ￿]xt (13)









t + ￿]xt (14)






where the cuto⁄ "￿
t is determined by the equation










in which the implicit function R(￿) is given by
R("￿












10Proof. In anticipation that the cuto⁄ is independent of i, consider two possible cases:
Case A. "t(i) ￿ "￿
t. In this case, the e⁄ective cash in hand is high. To smooth consumption, it
is optimal to save to prevent possible borrowing constraints in the future when cash in hand may
be low. So st+1(i) ￿ 0, ￿t(i) = 0, and the shadow value of good ￿t(i) = ￿Et
1+rt+1
(1+￿ g)wt+1. Equation






. The budget constraint (6) then






. The requirement st+1(i) ￿ 0 then implies






(1 + ￿ g)wt+1
￿￿1
￿ "￿
t + ￿; (18)
which de￿nes the cuto⁄ "￿
t.
Case B. "t(i) < "￿
t. In this case, the e⁄ective cash in hand is low. To maintain a smooth con-
sumption, it is then optimal not to save, so st+1(i) = 0 and ￿t(i) > 0. By the resource constraint (6),






























The above analyses imply that ￿t(i) takes two possible functional forms, depending on the
size of the realization of "t(i). Hence, the expected value, ~ E f["t(i) + ￿]￿t(i)g, can be expressed
analytically. As a result, the optimal cuto⁄, "￿
t, is determined by the Euler equation (16), which is
based on the ￿rst-order condition for labor supply (equation 10). Equations (16) and (17) imply
that the cuto⁄ "￿
t is independent of i because "(i) is i.i.d. Hence, equation (18), which de￿nes the
cuto⁄, implies that cash in hand (xt) is also independent of i.
2.4 Discussion
Notice that these decision rules are consistent with the budget identity, ct(i) + (1 + ￿ g)st+1(i) =
["t(i) + ￿]xt, and are very intuitive. Optimal consumption is a concave function of a target level of
wealth or cash in hand, ["￿







. When the wealth-income shock is low ("(i) < "￿), the marginal propensity to
consume is less than 1; when the wealth-income shock is high ("(i) ￿ "￿), the marginal propensity
to consume equals 1 and the individual does not save in this period. Therefore, saving is a bu⁄er
stock: The household saves (st+1(i) > 0) only if the wealth-income shock is high. These properties
are consistent with the literature on bu⁄er-stock saving (see, e.g., Deaton, 1991; Aiyagari, 1994,
11and Carroll, 1992, 1997), except here they are expressed analytically instead of numerically.
The target-wealth policy is an important feature of optimal bu⁄er-stock saving behaviors; this
behavior has also been noted by Deaton (1991) in a simpler partial-equilibrium model where labor
income is exogenous and subject to uninsured idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, this target behavior
is not driven by the assumption of wealth shocks in our model. Nonetheless, depending on the
particular models, the optimal target may or may not depend on an individual￿ s history and initial
wealth.24
Notice that R("￿
t) > 1 because it captures the extra rate of return to savings due to the liquidity
value of the bu⁄er stock under borrowing constraints. Hence, the e⁄ective rate of return to saving
is determined by the real interest rate compounded by a liquidity premium R(￿￿): (1 + r)R(￿￿) >
1 + r.
The intuition for optimal cash in hand xt to be independent of i is that (i) it is predetermined
before the realization of "t(i) and (ii) labor supply nt(i) can adjust elastically to target any level
of cash in hand under a constant marginal cost of leisure. That is, since all households face the
same distribution of idiosyncratic wealth-income shocks, the quasi-linear utility function makes it
feasible and optimal that households adjust their labor supply to target the same level of cash in
hand regardless of history. Thus, xt is the same across households regardless of the initial wealth
st(i). Consequently, all households start the second subperiod with the same cash in hand. Given
this target level of cash in hand, equation (15) determines the optimal level of the labor supply.
2.5 General Equilibrium




s(i)di, and N ￿
R
N(i)di;
and integrating the household decision rules over i by the law of large numbers, the policy functions
for the aggregate variables are given by
ct = D("￿
t)xt (19)
(1 + ￿ g)st+1 = H("￿
t)xt (20)























24But a model with a history-independent target wealth is much simpler to analyze.
12which satisfy 0 < D("￿) < 1 and D("￿) + H("￿) = 1.25
A general equilibrium is de￿ned as the sequences of aggregate variables f"￿
t;ct;kt+1;Nt;yt;wt;rtg,
such that (i) given prices fwt;rtg, households maximize utilities; (ii) given prices fwt;rtg, ￿rms max-
imize pro￿ts; (iii) the law of large numbers hold; (iv) all markets clear: st = kt and
R
Nt(i)di = Nt;
and (v) the standard transversality condition hold:
lim
T!1
E0￿T (1 + ￿ g)kT+1
cT
= 0: (24)
De￿ne the disposable income as }t ￿ rtst + wtNt + vt, which includes labor income, capital
gains, and lump-sum pro￿t income. Hence, the aggregate wealth income is related to disposable
income by the relation, xt = st+}t. Using this de￿nition, the consumption function and the saving
function together imply the household budget identity,
ct + (1 + ￿ g)st+1 ￿ st = }t: (25)
Namely, consumption plus net savings (i.e., net wealth accumulation) equals disposable income.
The aggregate saving rate can thus be de￿ned as the ratio of net savings to disposable income:
￿t ￿
St+1 ￿ St
rtSt + WtNt + Vt
=
(1 + ￿ g)st+1 ￿ st
}t
: (26)
Because of constant returns to scale, the pro￿t income vt = 0. Since st = kt, wt = (1 ￿ ￿)
yt
Nt,
and rt + ￿ = ￿
yt
kt, the household budget identity then becomes
ct + (1 + ￿ g)kt+1 ￿ kt = yt ￿ ￿kt; (27)
where yt ￿ ￿kt = }t is an alternative expression of disposable income. This aggregate household
budget identity is also the goods market clearing condition. The de￿nition of saving rate in equation
(26) in general equilibrium becomes
￿t ￿
(1 + ￿ g)kt+1 ￿ kt
yt ￿ ￿kt
; (28)
which is identical to the de￿nition adopted by Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006).
The system of equations that determine the general equilibrium of the model consists of equa-
tions (2), (3), (4), (16), (19), (20), (27), and the transversality condition (24). It can be easily
con￿rmed that this dynamic system has a unique saddle path near the steady state; that is, the
25Recall E"(i) = 1 ￿ ￿.
13system has exactly the same number of stable roots as the number of state variables.26 Hence,
these seven equations plus the transversality condition uniquely solve for the equilibrium path of
f"￿
t;ct;kt+1;Nt;yt;wt;rtg, given the distribution of "t, the path of fgtg, and the initial condition
k0.
3 Steady-State Analysis
A "steady state" is de￿ned as a situation without aggregate uncertainty wherein all variables and
distributions in the transformed economy are time invariant. In a steady state the TFP growth
rate gt = ￿ g for all t. It can be shown that the transformed model has a unique steady state. In the
steady state, equations (16), (19), (20), and (27) become
1 + ￿ g = ￿(1 + r)R("￿) (29)
c = D("￿)x (30)
(1 + ￿ g)k = H("￿)x (31)
c + ￿ gk = y ￿ ￿k; (32)
respectively, where x = k + }.
In equation (29), 1 + ￿ g represents the opportunity cost of saving (the opportunity cost of not
consuming the growing income today increases with the rate of income growth), and (1 + r)R("￿) is
the e⁄ective rate of return to saving. Because saving provides liquidity to bu⁄er unexpected shocks,
its e⁄ective rate of return is compounded by the liquidity premium R("￿) > 1. In equilibrium, the
marginal cost of saving equals its marginal bene￿ts.
Using equation (31) and realizing that H = 1￿D gives x =
1+￿ g
￿ g+D}. Substituting this relationship
into equations (30) and (32) gives the aggregate consumption and saving as functions of disposable
income:
c =
(1 + ￿ g)D





(1 + ￿ g)D
￿ g + D
￿
}: (34)
Therefore, the marginal propensity to consume from disposable income is given by MPC ￿
(1+￿ g)D
￿ g+D ,
which is less than 1 because D < 1, provided that ￿ g > 0. The aggregate saving rate is given by
￿ = 1 ￿
(1 + ￿ g)D("￿)
￿ g + D("￿)
: (35)
26By equation (16), the cuto⁄ "
￿
t is stationary along a balanced growth path as long as the growth rate gt is
stationary. Hence, the transversality condition is clearly satis￿ed by the consumption and saving functions.
14The saving rate depends positively on growth ￿ g. In particular, we have ￿ = 0 if ￿ g = 0, and ￿ > 0 if
￿ g > 0.27 Note that the saving rate depends on the cuto⁄, which a⁄ects the distribution of wealth
across households. The cuto⁄ in turn depends on the growth rate.
Proposition 2 If ￿ is small enough, an interior solution of the optimal cuto⁄ "￿ exists and is
uniquely determined by the following implicit equation:




1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿





Proof. Equation (29) implies a relationship for output-to-capital ratio: (1 + ￿ g) = ￿
￿





Equations (30) and (31) imply the consumption-to-capital ratio, c
k = (1 + ￿ g) D
H, which can be sub-
stituted into the resource constraint (32) to obtain another equation for the output-to-capital ratio:
￿





k. Combining these two restrictions yields equation (36).
Because
@R("￿)
@"￿ > 0, the left-hand side (LHS) decreases monotonically with "￿. In particular,
since "￿ 2 [0;"max] and "max > 1￿￿, the LHS has a minimum equal to LHS("max) =
1+￿ g
￿+"max < 1+￿ g
and a maximum equal to LHS(0) = (1 + ￿ g). On the other hand, because
D("￿)
H("￿) is monotonically
increasing in "￿, the right-hand side (RHS) has a maximum equal to in￿nity at "￿ = "max (because
H("max) = 0) and a minimum given by ￿
h
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
￿ g + ￿ + (1 + ￿ g) ￿
1￿￿
￿i
. That is, the RHS is
an upward-sloping curve.
Hence, as long as the maximum of the LHS exceeds the minimum of the RHS:
1 + ￿ g > ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿





a unique interior solution for "￿(￿ g) exists and this value is a function of the growth rate. Condition
(37) is clearly satis￿ed if the multiplier ￿ is small enough.
3.1 Discussion
Proposition 2 shows that an interior solution for the cuto⁄ exists only if the parameter ￿ is smaller
than a critical value ~ ￿, where ~ ￿ is determined by setting the inequality (37) to an equality. It is
clear that 0 < ~ ￿ < 1. In contrast, if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, then the minimum of the RHS of equation (36) exceeds
the maximum of the LHS, and we have a corner solution of "￿ = 0. In this case, only Case A
in the proof of Proposition 1 is relevant, so we have st+1(i) > 0 and ￿t(i) = 0 for all i. That is,
27Although net changes in the saving stock are zero (s ￿ s = 0) in the steady state if ￿ g = 0, the stock-to-income
ratio (
s
}) is always positive.
15the borrowing constraint never binds. Thus, equation (12) implies that ￿t(i) is independent of i.
Equations (10) and (9) then imply ct(i) = wt, which is also independent of i. In other words, when ￿
is large enough, because the extent of idiosyncratic risk is small, agents are able to perfectly smooth
their consumption through saving.28 It can be shown that in this case the aggregate allocation of
the model is similar to that of a representative-agent model. In the rest of the paper, we consider
only the case where ￿ < ~ ￿.
With the cuto⁄ "￿ determined, the capital-to-output ratio can then be derived from equation





1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)R("￿)
: (38)
Recall that in a standard, representative-agent neoclassical growth model with no borrowing con-





1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
: (39)
Hence, at the aggregate level the current model di⁄ers from the standard growth model by
the liquidity premium R("￿) ￿ 1, which arises because of the possibility of binding borrowing
constraints and precautionary saving motives. If the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks approaches
zero (i.e., the idiosyncratic uncertainty vanishes), then the liquidity premium approaches zero and
R("￿) ! 1 in the limit. Thus, borrowing constraints do not bind and the model reduces to a
standard growth model in the limit. This reveals the design of the model: The setup makes it
easy to compare this model with standard growth models regarding the in￿ uence of borrowing
constraints on the growth-saving relationship.








1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)R("￿)
: (40)




1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
< ￿: (41)
Notice the following implications:
28If ￿ is too large, the dispersion of "(i) is then too small.
16(1) Since R("￿) > 1, equations (38) and (39) suggest that the steady-state capital-to-output
ratio with uninsured risk and borrowing constraints is larger than that in standard growth models.
This point is noted by Aiyagari (1994).29
(2) @￿o
@￿ g > 0. That is, in a standard neoclassical growth model, the saving rate is an increasing
function of TFP growth. The intuition is that higher TFP growth raises the rate of returns to
capital and induces higher investment demand. Thus, the saving rate of households increases in
equilibrium due to a higher real interest rate. That is, high growth leads to high saving, as in
the data. This prediction is consistent with the numerical simulations of Chen, Imrohoroglu, and
Imrohoroglu (2006) for the Japanese economy under the assumption of perfect foresights.30
(3) Precautionary saving not only generates a higher saving rate for any given level of growth
rate (i.e., ￿ > ￿o), it also magni￿es the positive relationship between growth and saving in the
neoclassical model. That is, the cross-partial derivative @￿2
@￿ g@R is positive, because @￿
@￿ g > 0 (taking R
as given) and @￿
@R > 0 (taking ￿ g as given); hence, if in addition dR
d￿ g > 0, then borrowing constraints
enhance the positive e⁄ect of growth on saving. That is, if the liquidity premium is an increasing
function of growth, then borrowing constraints magnify the positive relationship between growth
and saving. This is ultimately the case because income growth induces consumption growth, which
tightens borrowing constraints and raises the liquidity premium. This point is easier to grasp if the
real interest rate is constant. In such a case, equation (29) indicates that R("￿) rises with ￿ g.
(4) Because of higher saving rates, the equilibrium interest rate in our model will be lower than
that in the standard growth model.
Figure 1 presents a graphic illustration of the e⁄ects of growth on saving. Consider the standard
growth model ￿rst. In the graph, a higher TFP growth from g1 to g2 rotates the investment curve
to the left from (g1 + ￿)k to (g2 + ￿)k and decreases the steady-state capital stock per e⁄ective
worker from k1 to k0. As a result, consumption per e⁄ective worker would fall below the modi￿ed
golden-rule level if the saving rate remain unchanged at ￿1. Hence, a higher saving (investment)
rate is called for to raise the steady-state capital stock to k2 so that consumption per e⁄ective
worker can be higher than it would be without the adjustment in the saving rate. However, in the
new steady state the capital stock is still lower than before (k2 < k1), because increasing the saving
rate further would be so costly that the rate of return to saving is less than the marginal cost:
￿(1 + r) < 1 + ￿ g. Therefore, the saving rate will increase only to the point where the discounted
equilibrium real interest rate equals the growth rate.
29Aiyagari (1995) argues that taxing capital is optimal in this type of incomplete-market models because of too
much savings.
30However, in the standard neoclassical growth model the real interest rate increases with TFP growth and is about
15% when the rate of growth reaches 10% per year.
17Figure 1. E⁄ects of Growth on Saving.
With borrowing constraints, the upward shift in the saving curve (￿1f(k)) is larger because a
lower capital stock raises the liquidity premium (as savings are a bu⁄er stock to self-insure against
idiosyncratic uncertainty), which induces the saving rate to rise further. This results in a higher
steady-state capital stock than k2 (i.e., a lower real interest rate), which is dynamically ine¢ cient
because it yields lower consumption per e⁄ective worker. Hence, as argued by Aiyagari (1994, 1995),
taxing capital (or the rate of return to savings) would be optimal when there exist precautionary
saving motives. However, our analysis here suggests that the optimal capital tax rate should be an
increasing function of the growth rate.
3.2 Calibration
To facilitate quantitative evaluation of the model, we calibrate the model by assuming that "t(i)





, with support "(i) 2 [0;"max] and the shape para-
meter ￿ 2 (0;1). We set the upper-bound parameter "max = 1+￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) to ensure E" = 1 ￿ ￿.
With this speci￿cation, we have























The model￿ s structural parameters are calibrated as follows: The time period is a year, the time
discounting factor ￿ = 0:96, the output elasticity of capital ￿ = 0:4, and the rate of capital
depreciation ￿ = 0:1. As a benchmark, we pick ￿ = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:15. These values imply
that the Gini coe¢ cient of ￿nancial wealth in the model, (1 + r)s(i), is 0:79. This value roughly
matches that of the major emerging economies in terms of wealth inequality. For example, the
Gini coe¢ cient of wealth is 0:71 for Thailand, 0:76 for Indonesia, and 0:78 for Brazil (see, e.g.,
Davies et al., 2006). The reported Gini coe¢ cient for China is 0:55, which is likely signi￿cantly
underestimated; the true value might be somewhere close to that in Indonesia and Brazil.31 The
calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Value 0:96 0:4 0:1 0:1 0:15
Table 2 presents the quantitative e⁄ects of growth and borrowing constraints on saving rates. In
Table 2, Model A represents the counterpart representative-agent neoclassical growth model (called
a "standard growth model" in this paper), and Model B represents the heterogenous-agent model
with borrowing constraints. Consider the standard growth model ￿rst (the middle row). The table
shows that high growth leads unambiguously to high saving. For example, when the growth rate
is at 1% per year, the saving rate is less than 4%; when the growth rate increases to 10% per year,
the saving rate rises to nearly 20%. Thus, theory predicts that high growth leads to high saving,
which is consistent with the data, but in sharp contrast to PIH.
High growth leads to high saving in the standard growth model primarily because TFP growth
enhances the productivity of capital, which raises the demand for investment, which in turn raises
the interest rate and consequently leads to increased saving in equilibrium. In contrast, the con-
ventional PIH is presented in a partial-equilibrium framework with a constant real interest rate,
so high growth is not accompanied by high asset returns. Thus, consumers have no incentives to
increase saving but opt to raise their marginal propensity to consume when permanent income
rises.
Table 2. Saving Rate (￿) as a Function of Mean Growth (￿ g)
￿ g 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Model A ￿ 3:6% 6:5% 9:0% 11:2% 13:0% 14:6% 16:0% 17:3% 18:4% 19:4%
Model B ￿ 5:4% 10% 13:9% 17:2% 20:1% 22:6% 24:9% 26:9% 28:7% 30:3%
￿ Model A, standard growth model; Model B, with borrowing constraints.
31The Gini coe¢ cient is 0:8 for the United States.
19Borrowing constraints can signi￿cantly amplify the neoclassical growth e⁄ect on saving. The
bottom row in Table 2 shows that with borrowing constraints, the saving rate not only is much
higher than in the standard model at each corresponding rate of growth, but the gap also increases
with the growth rate. For example, when the growth rate is at 1% per year, the saving rate is
5:4% in Model B, which is 1:8 percentage points higher than that in Model A. However, when the
growth rate is at 10% per year, the saving rate is 30:3% in Model B, which is about 11 percentage
points higher than that in Model A. This implies that borrowing constraints magnify the positive
e⁄ect of growth on saving.32
Figure 2. The Growth E⁄ects on Saving and Interest.
The information in Table 2 is graphed in the left panel in Figure 2, where the line with circles
represents the standard growth model (Model A), and the line with triangles the model with
borrowing constraints (Model B). It shows that (i) high growth leads to high saving in both models,
32Borrowing constraints per se will induce a higher saving rate because of the bu⁄er-stock role of savings, other
things equal. However, if there were no ampli￿cation e⁄ects, borrowing constraints would generate only a constantly
higher saving rate than the standard growth model when the growth rate rises, instead of an increasingly higher rate,
as shown in Table 2.
20but (ii) the e⁄ects are much stronger in Model B than in Model A and the multiplier e⁄ect rises
with growth.
Borrowing constraints not only signi￿cantly magnify the growth e⁄ect on saving, but also mit-
igate the growth e⁄ect on interest rates. Table 3 shows that the real interest rate increases with
growth in the standard model (Model A). Since a higher TFP growth implies a higher opportunity
cost of saving, the rate of return to saving (the real interest rate) must also increase accordingly
to induce a higher saving rate. With borrowing constraints (Model B), however, the real interest
rate not only is signi￿cantly lower than in the standard growth model at every level of growth,
but also increases less rapidly with growth. For example, when the growth rate is 1% to 3%, the
implied real interest rate is about 5% to 7% without borrowing constraints (Model A), but only
about 1% to 3% with borrowing constraints (Model B). Also, when the growth rate rises to 8% to
10%, the implied interest rate jumps up to 13% to 15% without borrowing constraints (Model A),
but increases only to about 6% to 7% with borrowing constraints (Model B). The intuition is that
precautionary saving results in a higher steady-state capital-to-output ratio, so the real interest
rate is lower than in the standard model for any given growth rate. In addition, since the liquidity
premium (R) rises with growth, the strength of precautionary saving also increases with growth,
hence leading to much higher capital-to-output ratios and more subdued real interest rates.
Table 3. Equilibrium Interest Rate (r) as a Function of Mean Growth (￿ g)
￿ g 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
Model A ￿ 5:2% 6:3% 7:3% 8:3% 9:4% 10:4% 11:5% 12:5% 13:5% 14:6%
Model B ￿ 1:3% 2:0% 2:7% 3:3% 4:0% 4:6% 5:3% 5:9% 6:6% 7:2%
￿ Model A, standard growth model; Model B, with borrowing constraints.
The information in Table 3 is graphed in the right panel in Figure 2, where triangles represent the
model with borrowing constraints (Model B) and circles the model without borrowing constraints
(Model A). Clearly, not only does the line with borrowing constraints lie signi￿cantly below that
without borrowing constraints at all levels of growth rates, its slope is also less steep.
4 Dynamic Analysis
This section examines the relationship between growth and saving under transitional dynamics.
We consider two scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario, there is no aggregate uncertainty (gt = ￿ g), and
we study behaviors of the saving rate and its relationship to growth when an economy starts out
"poor", in the sense of having a capital stock below the steady state. We show that the model with
borrowing constraints will have not only a higher growth rate but also a signi￿cantly higher saving
rate along the path converging to the steady state than the model without borrowing constraints,
21although both models share the same steady state and rate of TFP growth. Since di⁄erent degrees
of borrowing constraints lead to di⁄erent steady states, to ensure that the two model economies
converge to the same steady state, we assume that in the borrowing-constrained economy the
constraints are gradually reduced (by decreasing the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks, ￿) along
the transitional path so that they no longer bind in the long run.33 The other parameters are
calibrated to the same values as shown in Table 1, and the steady-state rate of TFP growth is set
to ￿ g = 0:04 for both economies.
Figure 3. Transitional Dynamics.
Figure 3 depicts the saving rate (left panel) and the growth rate of investment (right panel) as a
function of the capital stock for the two economies. The dots represent equally spaced points in time
as the system evolves toward the shared steady state. The triangle symbols represent the model
with borrowing constraints, and circles the counterpart model without borrowing constraints. Both
models start with the same level of capital stock, but the model with borrowing constraints starts
33Namely, we have ￿ ! 1 in the model without borrowing constraints.
22with ￿ = 0:15 in the ￿rst period and this value increases over time (in every subsequent period)
until it becomes large enough so that the two models converge to the same steady state in the long
run.
Figure 3 shows that an initially poor economy will have both a higher-than-steady-state saving
rate and a higher-than-steady-state growth rate, regardless of borrowing constraints. However,
borrowing constraints reinforce this positive relationship between saving and growth so that the
borrowing-constrained economy will exhibit a much higher saving rate and a moderately higher
growth rate than the counterpart economy at any point in time.34 For example, the saving rate is
about 7 percentage points higher and the growth rate is about 0:1 percentage points higher with
borrowing constraints than without in the initial period. The intuition for this pattern is that bor-
rowing constraints induce excessive saving, and the lower the capital-to-output ratio, the greater is
the need for a bu⁄er stock and the larger is the implied liquidity premium, which results in stronger
precautionary saving, more rapid capital accumulation, and higher growth along the transitional
path, even though the TFP growth rate is the same (4% a year) across the two economies.
Figure 4. Impulse Responses of Saving to 1% Growth Shock.
34Since time is discrete, we assume that in the initial period the growth rate equals the steady-state rate and there
is a sudden destruction of the capital stock.
23In the second scenario, we introduce aggregate uncertainty and study the impulse responses
of the saving rate to transitory TFP growth shocks. A transitory increase in the growth rate
implies that income rises permanently from one level to another but not its growth rate. We
use the growth process speci￿ed in equation (1) to drive the model by setting the mean annual
growth rate to ￿ g = 0:04 with persistence ￿g = 0:2, consistent with postwar U.S. data. Figure
4 shows the responses (percentage deviations) of the saving rate (￿t) to a 1 standard-deviation
transitory increase in the growth rate, gt. Since the transformed model is solved by the method of
log-linearization around the steady state, all changes in Figure 4 represent percentage deviations
relative to the steady state.
The top-left panel in Figure 4 depicts the standard growth model, and the bottom-left panel
the borrowing-constrained model. In either case, the saving rate rises after a positive shock to TFP
growth. This happens because the higher rate of returns to capital induces investment demand and
stimulates saving.35 Therefore, in sharp contrast to the prediction of the PIH, households increase
rather than decrease their saving when permanent income rises, even though the higher growth
rate and the consequently higher saving rate are purely transitory.36
The above results are not sensitive to the de￿nition of the saving rate adopted in this paper




yt ), it still responds positively to a growth shock, regardless of borrowing
constraints (see the top-right and bottom-right panels in Figure 4). These analyses suggest that
consumption growth responds less than one for one to income growth, whereas investment growth
(saving) responds more than one for one to income growth. Hence, once the interest rate becomes
endogenous, there does not exist the so called "excess smoothness puzzle" of consumption relative
to income discussed in the consumption literature.37
A Deeper Puzzle. However, here arises another puzzle: In the general-equilibrium models pre-
sented previously, the real interest rate is also the rate of return to capital; hence, high TFP growth
leads to high saving through a high real interest rate. But the empirical evidence suggests that
for fast-growing emerging economies the rate of return to capital may be extremely high but the
interest rates facing households may be extremely low. For example, the average 3-month nominal
deposit rate in China was about 3:3% per year (the average 1-year rate was about 5:6% per year)
from 1990 to 2006,38 suggesting negative real deposit rates, yet the average real rate of return to
capital was more than 20% per year in that period (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian, 2006). In the meantime,
35The absolute change in the saving rate is larger in the borrowing-constrained model because it has a higher
steady-state saving rate.
36However, the income level has jumped up permanently.
37For more analysis on the "excess smoothness puzzle", see Wen (2009) and the references therein.
38The average in￿ ation rate was above 6% in that period. Data for interest rates are not available before 1990.
24the household saving rate in that period was about 25%, the national saving rate was about 40%,
and the average growth rate of real GDP per capita was about 10% per year. The situation is
similar in Japan. During the high-growth and high-saving period of Japan in the 1960-70s, the
average nominal 3-month deposit rate was about 4%,39 and the average after-tax real rate of return
to capital was above 16%, whereas the average household saving rate was about 17%, the national
saving rate was about 20%, and the average growth rate of real income was above 10%.
In addition, in both economies (Japan and China) during their respective high-growth periods,
bank deposits have been the major means of saving for households, as well as the most important
source of funds for ￿rms￿investment. For example, in China, bank deposits accounted for 72% of
total household ￿nancial assets in 2004 and 2005. In contrast, the total share of bonds and stocks
accounted for less than 10% of household ￿nancial assets in that period. On the other hand, the
share of bank loans in total corporate debt was about 64% in 2004 and 2005, while the total share
of corporate bonds and stocks was only around 15% in that period.
Therefore, regardless of how interest rates are kept low in fast-growing economies, the puzzle
is not just why high saving is positively correlated with high growth, but why high saving is
possible under low interest rates. Namely, why would households save excessively to ￿nance ￿rms￿
investment when the returns to their savings are so low and do not re￿ ect the high returns to
capital or TFP growth?40 We address this puzzle in the next section.
5 Fixed Deposit Rates
In developing economies, because of incomplete markets and various forms of ￿nancial repression
(including distorted government banking regulations and monetary policies), large spreads may
exist between deposit rates that households receive for their savings and the true rates of returns to
capital that ￿rms receive for their investment. If such spreads exist, how do they a⁄ect the relation-
ship between saving and growth? This section analyzes this issue by conducting a counterfactual
experiment.
5.1 With Capital
Suppose that the real interest rate faced by households is not the same as the marginal product
of capital. In particular, suppose households have no access to investment opportunities except
earning a low, ￿xed real interest rate (￿ r) on their deposits at ￿nancial intermediaries. On the
other hand, ￿rms must pay the market real interest rate (rt) to obtain loans, and banks earn
39The real deposit rate is negative because the average in￿ ation rate was also above 6% in Japan in that period.
40This puzzle may be related to the well-known empirical failure in the literature to identify a signi￿cantly positive
relationship between saving and interest rates.
25"monopolistic" pro￿ts from the spread in rates of returns, (rt ￿ ￿ r)st ￿ 0.41 For simplicity, assume
that the pro￿ts, vt = (rt ￿ ￿ r)st, are redistributed as lump sum to households.
In a standard growth model, a ￿xed deposit rate is inconsistent with general equilibrium because
the equilibrium condition,
1 + ￿ g = ￿ (1 + ￿ r); (45)
must hold to ensure positive household saving in the steady state. This condition will be violated
when the growth rate rises ￿ that is, 1+￿ g > ￿ (1 + ￿ r) ￿ so household saving will become zero (or
negative if borrowing is allowed) and the marginal product of capital will become in￿nity. Hence,
investment demand will drive up the deposit rate in equilibrium to induce positive saving. So a
￿xed deposit rate below the market interest rate cannot constitute an equilibrium in a standard
growth model.
However, in models with uninsured risk and borrowing constraints, a ￿xed deposit rate below
the market interest rate can be supported by general equilibrium. Because the liquidity premium,
R("￿), can rise endogenously with growth, equation (29) can continue to hold in equilibrium even
with a ￿xed interest rate:
1 + ￿ g = ￿(1 + ￿ r)R("￿); (46)
where the cuto⁄ "￿(￿ g) is a function of growth. This equation shows that if the deposit rate lies
below the market real interest rate, the liquidity premium will rise so that the e⁄ective rate of
return to saving increases to balance the marginal costs and bene￿ts of saving.
This current model with the spread in the rates of returns can be solved exactly as discussed
in Section 2. In equilibrium, we still have the capital market-clearing condition, st = kt; namely,
the supply of capital equals its demand.42 In the steady state, we have the following analogous
relationships and decision rules:
c = D("￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)k + y] (47)
(1 + ￿ g)k = H("￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)k + y] (48)





The above equations imply that the saving rate is still determined by the formula in equation (35):
￿ = 1 ￿
(1+￿ g)D
￿ g+D . However, the implied value of the saving rate given by this equation now di⁄ers
41In China, all banks are state owned and the government has monopoly power on setting the deposit rates and
loan rates. In Japan, although banks are privately owned, the government nonetheless had great in￿ uence on banks￿
interest rates in the 1950-70s.
42Because of the below-equilibrium deposit rate, the demand of capital is "rationed." This implies that the marginal
product of capital exceeds the real deposit rate ￿ r. The pro￿ts from the spread are earned by banks by assumption,
so ￿rms still pay a market interest rate equal to the marginal products of capital and earn zero pro￿ts.
26from that given by equation (40) because the deposit rate (￿ r) in equation (46) is no longer equal
to the marginal product of capital, r = ￿
y
k ￿ ￿. Hence, the value of the cuto⁄ ("￿) determined
by equation (46) di⁄ers from that in the previous model. In particular, with a ￿xed deposit rate
below the market rate, the optimal cuto⁄ "￿ is higher and increases faster as ￿ g rises. That is, for
any given level of the growth rate, the portion of the population with positive saving is smaller in
the current model with a low ￿xed deposit rate.
Figure 5. E⁄ects of Fixed Deposit Rate.
In Figure 5, the line with squares in the left-panel shows the relationship between saving and
growth when the real deposit rate is ￿xed at 1% per year. For comparison, in Figure 5 we also
include the same curves shown in Figure 2. The left-panel in Figure 5 shows that, even with such
a low and ￿xed deposit rate, households still save signi￿cantly more of their disposable income
than they do in the standard growth model at various levels of the growth rate (compare the two
lines with squares and circles), although the saving rates are lower than those in the counterpart
model without the distorting interest spread (the line with triangles). For example, when the
27growth rate is about 3% a year, the saving rate in the standard growth model without borrowing
constraints is about 9%; however, this rate is about 13% in the current model despite an essentially
zero deposit rate. Therefore, income uncertainty and borrowing constraints are able to generate
excessive savings even under low interest rates.
More importantly, thanks again to borrowing constraints, as the growth rate increases, the
saving rate in the current model also rises accordingly, despite the low and ￿xed deposit rate. That
is, even though TFP growth does not transmit to the rate of returns to household savings, the
saving rate still increases rapidly with economic growth. For example, when the rate of income
growth increases from 3% to 10% a year, the saving rate increases from 13% to 25%. The reason
behind this substantial rise in saving is that TFP growth a⁄ects real wages, and a faster wage
growth leads to a lower bu⁄er stock-to-income ratio. Hence, the liquidity premium rises, which
induces a higher saving rate. That is, uninsured risk and borrowing constraints make the marginal
propensity to save positively dependent on permanent income due to a rising liquidity premium
with income growth. Hence, even if the real deposit rate is ￿xed at extremely low levels, households
still opt to increase their propensity to save when permanent income increases. Similar results hold
even if the real deposit rate is negative.43
On the other hand, the right-panel in Figure 5 shows that the real rate of return to capital (the
marginal product) in the current model with a ￿xed deposit rate (the line with square symbols) is
higher than that in the counterpart model with borrowing constraints and a ￿ exible rate (the line
with triangles), and it rises faster when the growth rate increases. This explains why fast-growing
economies may simultaneously exhibit low deposit rates and high (and apparently undiminished)
rates of returns to capital.
The property that the marginal propensity to save depends positively on the level of permanent
income is the sole consequence of uninsured risk and borrowing constraints. That is, uninsured
risk and borrowing constraints can completely alter the PIH and generate exactly the opposite
prediction of the PIH. The intuition is that with uninsured risk and borrowing constraints, a higher
income growth (￿ g) induces a larger liquidity premium (R) because of a lower bu⁄er stock-to-￿ ow
ratio and thus a tighter borrowing constraint, which results in a higher e⁄ective rate of return to
saving.
5.2 Without Capital
This powerful e⁄ect of precautionary saving on the growth-saving relationship can manifest itself
even in a simpler equilibrium framework where there is no capital and both the real interest rate
and the real wage are exogenous. For example, consider the special case where ￿ = 0 and household
43The liquidity premium has an upper bound given by R(￿) ￿ ￿+"max, which imposes a lower bound on the deposit
rate, ￿ r ￿
1
￿(￿+"max) ￿ 1. Clearly, this lower bound can be negative if "max is large enough.
28savings are simply inventories that earn a constant real interest rate ￿ r. The production function
then becomes Yt = ZtNt. The real wage then becomes completely exogenous, Wt = Zt, which
grows over time at the rate gt. Since the household￿ s maximization program (5) has not changed,
this "partial-equilibrium" model44 has closed-form solutions analogous to equations (46) through
(49):
1 + ￿ g = ￿(1 + ￿ r)R("￿) (51)
c = D("￿)x (52)
(1 + ￿ g)s = H("￿)x (53)
c + ￿ gs = }; (54)
where x = s + } and } = ￿ rs + wN + v. Hence, the saving rate is still given by the same formula,
￿ = 1￿
(1+￿ g)D
￿ g+D , and the relationship between saving and growth is identical to that implied by the
graph in the left panel in Figure 5 (i.e., the line with squares).45
Figure 6. Impulse Responses of Saving to 1% Growth Shock.
44With a little abuse of language, we call this simpler model "partial-equilibrium" model even though it is not, which
helps to distinguish this model from the model with ￿xed deposit rate and the model with ￿ exible market-determined
interest rate.
45Note that the optimal household saving stock in this simpler model would be zero without idiosyncratic risk and
borrowing constraints. That is, if "(i) = 1￿￿ and ￿ g ￿ ￿ r, we would have st+1(i) = 0 for all i and t. This is consistent
with the prediction of the PIH: High growth leads to low savings.
29This "partial-equilibrium" analysis further reveals that uninsured risk and borrowing constraints
alone (without the neoclassical, general-equilibrium, endogenous interest mechanism) can com-
pletely alter the predictions of the PIH by making the marginal propensity to consume negatively
dependent on the changes in permanent labor income. The reason is again precisely that the liq-
uidity premium for savings rises with income growth because agents want to maintain a constant
saving stock-to-wealth ratio to provide enough liquidity to bu⁄er idiosyncratic shocks along the
balanced growth path; since the bu⁄er stock-to-income ratio decreases when income grows faster,
the liquidity premium therefore rises to induce a higher saving rate. Hence, high growth leads to
high saving despite zero interest rates.
This prediction holds true even if the higher wage growth is purely temporary in the partial-
equilibrium model. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where the line with squares shows the impulse
responses of saving in the partial-equilibrium model to a transitory 1% growth shock, and the line
with triangles represents the counterpart general-equilibrium model with borrowing constraints
(studied previously in Figure 4 with a market-determined deposit rate). It is clear from Figure 6
that the saving rate still responds positively to growth, albeit with a smaller magnitude because
of a lower and ￿xed real interest rate, even though the change in growth is purely temporary and
there is no capital.
6 The Experience of Japan and China
6.1 The Japanese Experience
Aoki (1986, p. 579) notes that Japanese families hold most of their savings in the form of safe assets
such as bank deposits and postal savings accounts despite the much higher after-tax returns on
stock holdings. According to the survey by the Central Council for Financial Services Information
in Japan, even as recently as 2004, the share of deposits in total household ￿nancial assets was
41:5%, while the share of postal savings was 18:6%. Therefore, the share of bank deposits and
postal savings together accounted for 60:1% of household ￿nancial assets (Kishi, 2005, p. 808).
This ratio was much higher before the 1970s. Kishi (2005, p. 809) also notes that "In regard to
the Japanese household portfolio, safety is the highest priority." Horioka (1990) notes that interest
rates on bank and postal deposits have been regulated at relatively low levels, but the rates of
return on corporate equities have been very high. One would therefore expect the much higher
rates of return on equities to lead to a higher share of the household￿ s portfolio being held in such
assets. However, the share of equities is quite low (Horioka, 1990, p. 83). For example, the share
of equities was 7:4% in 2001 (Korb, 2001). Such empirical evidence suggests that deposit rates,
instead of the rates of returns to capital, were the most relevant interest rates for household saving
30in Japan in the postwar period.
However, the household saving rate in postwar Japan is well known for being one of the highest
in the world. The average household saving rate in the 1957-74 period was 18% and it reached 23%
in 1972. The average income-growth rate was about 10% per year in that period. Yet the 3-month
nominal deposit rate remained essentially ￿xed at 4% per year and the nominal 1-year deposit rate
was also essentially ￿xed at 5:5% per year during the 1960-72 period (Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976,
p. 261). The average in￿ ation rate in the sample period was above 6% per year, higher than the
deposit rates, making the average real deposit rates negative.46 In addition, the spread between the
real deposit rate and the real rate of return to capital was extremely large, close to 20 percentage
points during that high-growth period (see, e.g., Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu, 2006).
6.2 The Chinese Experience
According to Kraay (2000), between 1978 and 1995, the main source of the increase in household
saving was the rapid growth of household deposits in the banking system, which accounts for the
bulk of the increase in the saving rate. For example, by 1995 the net change in deposits was more
than three times larger than individual investments. Wei and Zhang (2009) document that the
household saving rate rose from 16% in 1980 to 30% in 2007, and they also argue that corporate
saving is not yet quantitatively as important as household saving in modern China.
Xie (1992) presents data for the structure of household ￿nancial assets in China during the
1978-91 period. The data show that cash and deposits accounted for 100% of total household
￿nancial assets in 1978, and this number remained as high as 90% in 1991 despite rapid growth
in income and ￿nancial wealth. Yi and Song (2008) present data for the 1991-2007 period. Their
data show that bank deposits accounted for 72% of total household ￿nancial assets in 2004 and
2005. In contrast, the share of bonds and stocks accounted only for 3:5% and 6:3%, respectively,
in 2004; and 3:1% and 5:5%, respectively, in 2005. On the other hand, bank loans have been the
major source of external funds for non￿nancial ￿rms. For example, the share of bank loans in total
corporate debt was 63:3% in 2004 and 64% in 2005. In contrast, the share of corporate bonds and
stocks was 0:6% and 15:3%, respectively, in 2004; and was 1:3% and 12:8%, respectively, in 2005.
Hence, bank deposits have been not only the major means of saving for Chinese households,
but also the most important source of external funds for Chinese ￿rms. Therefore, deposit rates
are the most relevant interest rates for saving decisions in China, instead of the rates of returns to
productive capital.
Figure 7 depicts the household saving ratio (left axis), the 3-month nominal deposit rate (left
46Horiuchi (1984) argues that the interest rates in Japan in the postwar period were not particularly low compared
with those in the United States and developed European countries. However, with respect to Japan￿ s extraordinary
high growth and rates of return to capital, the interest rates in Japan were indeed very low.
31axis), and long-term household-income growth rate (right axis) for the period of 1953-2006. The
household saving rate is de￿ned as the ratio between net wealth changes and disposable income, and
the long-term income-growth rate is de￿ed as the average growth rate of the past 14 years, following
Modigliani and Cao (2004).47 The ￿gure shows that the household saving rate traces the long-term
income growth rate very closely and has been increasing steadily since 1978. The household saving
rate peaked in 2006 at 37%. The bulk of the household saving is contributed by bank deposits and
government bonds (net changes), which, as a fraction of disposable income, remained at 27% in
2003, suggesting that safe and low yield assets have been the major means of saving for Chinese
households. On the other hand, the interest rates remained very low in the post-reform period.
For example, the average nominal 3-month deposit rate was 3:3% (and the average 1-year rate was
5:6%) while the average in￿ ation rate was about 6% in the 1991-2007 period.48 Yet the average
real rate of return to capital was more than 20% per year in that period (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian,
2006).
Figure 7. Household Saving Ratio (left scale) and Income Growth (right scale)
Such extremely high saving rates in conjunction with very low real interest rates are di¢ cult
to reconcile with standard growth theories. According to the conventional "saving-causes-growth"
theory, high growth is the result of high saving. Based on the "growth-causes-saving" theory, high
47Household wealth includes deposits, bonds, and individual investments. Excluding individual investments lowers
the saving rate slightly but does not change the dynamic pattern of the saving ratio.
48Data for the interest rates before 1990 are not available.
32growth leads to high returns to capital, hence encouraging high saving through a high equilibrium
interest rate. But both theories require high interest rates to induce high saving, so neither theory
can explain why saving is so high while the interest rate is so low in fast-growing economies, such
as Japan in the 1950-70s and China over the past 30 years.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a simple growth model to show that uninsured risk and borrowing constraints
can completely alter the relationship between the marginal propensity to consume and permanent
income, so that higher permanent income can lead to increased saving, instead of higher consump-
tion, counter to the prediction of the PIH. The results are independent of capital accumulation and
the neoclassical linkage between the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate.
Uninsured idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints give rise to a liquidity premium to
reward precautionary savings. This liquidity premium is shown to be an increasing function of
income growth because faster income growth reduces the steady-state saving stock-to-￿ ow ratio
and raises the liquidity value of the bu⁄er stock. Hence, high growth can lead to high saving
through a higher rate of return to liquidity even if the interest rates on household deposits are low
and repressed by banking regulations.
Therefore, precautionary saving under borrowing constraints can support a large spread between
the deposit rates and the rates of return to capital. That China￿ s rate of return to capital has been
so high (about 23% per year) and shown little sign of diminishing despite an investment-to-output
ratio in excess of 40% is consistent with this hypothesis. One immediate implication is that if the
spread in China were eliminated by allowing interest rates to rise to market levels, the saving rate
in China would rise even further. This suggests that, given the severity of idiosyncratic uncertainty
and the lack of social safety nets and risk-sharing markets in China, the current Chinese saving
rate may not be high enough, but lower than it should be, counter to popular views.49
Our analysis not only explains why high growth can lead to high saving despite low and ￿xed
real interest rates, but also provides a rational for the phenomenon of global imbalances that
￿nancial capital ￿ ows from emerging economies toward developed countries but FDI ￿ ows into
these fast-growing economies from industrial nations. We use a highly stylized model to make the
arguments as straightforward as possible. While permitting closed-form solutions to inspect the
mechanisms in a transparent way, the simplifying assumptions underlying the model also impose
some limitations. Nonetheless, we believe that the main insight of this paper does not hinge on the
speci￿c assumptions of our model and should persist in more general and realistic settings. The
main limitations of the current model include the following:
49On the other hand, ￿nancial development is expected to enhance risk sharing and reduce borrowing constraints,
thus ultimately lowering China￿ s high saving rates.
331. To obtain closed-form solutions, interior solutions for hours worked are assumed. However, if
the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks is too large, the non-negativity constraint on labor supply
(Nt(i) ￿ 0) may start binding for some households with high realizations of "(i) in the previous
period. Although this should not a⁄ect the main ￿ndings of the paper qualitatively, the quantitative
results may be a⁄ected. For example, with a non-negative constraint on hours binding, households
may opt to consume more when the realization of "(i) is large, anticipating that in the next period
hours cannot go below zero. Although this may change the average saving rate for a given rate
of growth, it should not a⁄ect the insight that a higher growth rate for income ￿ ow will lower the
steady-state stock-to-income ratio, hence raising the liquidity premium and the saving rate. Also,
analysis shows that (i) this non-negativity constraint on labor supply never binds if the idiosyncratic
shocks are placed on preferences and (ii) with preference shocks the model generates very similar
results.
2. The model is not designed to explain wealth distribution or income inequality. Wealth
distribution in the model is exogenously driven by idiosyncratic wealth shocks and these shocks are
i.i.d. Hence, it is not realistic to expect the model to explain the persistence and distribution of
wealth in the data. We reverse-engineered the model by assuming a distribution of wealth to match
the Gini coe¢ cient in the data. Idiosyncratic wealth shocks in the model are purely a technical
device to induce precautionary savings and make the model analytically tractable. The basic results
are expected to hold under more realistic idiosyncratic shocks (such as persistent earning shocks).
3. Under quasi-linear preferences the implied elasticity of labor supply is in￿nity. Although
developing countries such as China may have a highly elastic labor supply, this certainly does not
last forever and does not apply to developed countries. If this assumption is relaxed (i.e., if the
cost of labor supply is convex), agents will be less able to target a wealth level that is independent
of initial wealth and, as a result, the optimal target level of wealth will be history dependent. In
this case, numerical solution methods are required to solve the model. However, this should not
a⁄ect the main ￿ndings of this paper because it remains optimal to form a target level of the bu⁄er
stock even though the target itself may be history dependent.
4. As in the standard literature (e.g., Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2000; Chen, Imrohoroglu,
and Imrohoroglu, 2006), the model does not distinguish household saving from national saving.
That is, ￿rms￿investment is assumed to be ￿nanced entirely by household savings. Although
household saving is the single most important component of aggregate saving in China (Wei and
Zhang, 2009), corporate saving nonetheless is also important and has risen rapidly in recent years.
For this reason, we cannot fully account for the 40% average national saving rate observed in
China, although our model does a reasonably good job in accounting for the Chinese household
saving rate. In particular, without the spread in the rates of return, the model with borrowing
34constraints implies that, under a 10% annual growth rate, the national saving rate is about 30%,
whereas with low and ￿xed deposit rates, the implied saving rate is between 20% and 30%. Other
factors besides TFP growth and borrowing constraints (e.g., corporate saving, international trade
surplus, public ￿nance) can a⁄ect the national saving rate. These factors are not analyzed in this
paper.
5. As a ￿rst-order approximation and a ￿rst step in analyzing the e⁄ects of borrowing constraints
on the growth-to-saving relationship in an in￿nite-horizon model, this paper has considered only
situations around the balanced growth path. Since China is still in a transition period, it is not
clear how this would a⁄ect the quantitative predictions of the model once we allow the model to
deviate su¢ ciently far from the steady state. These issues and limitations can be addressed in
future studies by extending the current simple framework to a richer environment.
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39Appendix (not for publication)
This appendix shows that the results in this paper do not hinge on the log utility function.
Namely, the results are not dictated by the special feature that the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion equals 1.
Suppose the utility function is given by U(C;N) = C1￿￿
1￿￿ ￿ aN, where ￿ 2 (0;1) measures
the degree of risk aversion. Since consumption grows over time, if the parameter a is con-
stant, the relative weight of leisure will shrink to zero, unless a also grows over time accord-
ingly. Hence, to ensure balanced growth, assume a = (1 + ￿ g)
t(1￿￿). This implies that leisure
time as a fraction of time endowment is constant over time, consistent with the empirical evidence
(see, e.g., Ramey and Francis, 2009). By the same transformation as in the main text, we have

























ct(i) + (1 + ￿ g)st+1(i) ￿ [￿ + "t(i)][(1 + rt)st(i) + wtNt(i)] (55)
st+1(i) ￿ 0: (56)
For households, except the utility function, the economic environment is exactly the same as before.
Therefore, the decision rules of an individual￿ s consumption and saving plans are also characterized
by a cuto⁄strategy and are nearly identical to those in the benchmark model. Hence, the derivation
steps are omitted.





















t)[(1 + rt)kt + wtNt] (59)
(1 + ￿ g)kt+1 = H("￿
t)[(1 + rt)kt + wtNt] (60)























and the functions fD("￿);H("￿)g are the same as in equations (22) and (23). Note the function
R("￿) di⁄ers from the previous model unless ￿ = 1. In particular, the value of R exceeds that in
the previous model if ￿ > 1, and it increases with ￿. This suggests that highly risk-averse agents
value the liquidity of the bu⁄er stock more than do low-risk-averse agents.
In the steady state, we have
(1 + ￿ g)
￿ = ￿(1 + r)R("￿) (66)
c = D("￿)x (67)
(1 + ￿ g)k = H("￿)x (68)
c + ￿ gk = y ￿ ￿k; (69)
where x = (1 ￿ ￿)k + y is the wealth income. De￿ne the disposable income } ￿ y ￿ ￿k. Thus, the
consumption and saving functions are the same as before:
c =
(1 + ￿ g)D





(1 + ￿ g)D
￿ g + D
￿
}: (71)
Therefore, the national saving rate is given by the same function as in the previous model:
￿ = 1 ￿
(1 + ￿ g)D("￿)
￿ g + D("￿)
: (72)
However, because the function R in equation (65) depends on the value of ￿, the cuto⁄ "￿ will
also be a function of ￿, as is the saving rate. The equation that determines the value of the cuto⁄
is given by





1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿





which is analogous to equation (36). Assuming that " follows the same distribution as in the
previous model, we have
R("￿) = 1 +
￿
￿￿






















Notice that ￿ < 1 + ￿ is necessary to ensure that the function R("￿) is greater than 1. This is
good news because ￿ 2 (0;1) and the inequality of the wealth distribution in the current model
depends only on the relative magnitude j￿ ￿ ￿j. Hence, to generate the same Gini coe¢ cient in
wealth distribution when ￿ > 1, we can simply raise the value of ￿ accordingly. In other words,
with a large degree of risk aversion, even a small variance in the idiosyncratic wealth shocks can
generate a large enough inequality across households.50
Figure 8. The Growth E⁄ects on Saving and Interest (￿ = 5).
Let the structural parameters take the following values: ￿ = 0:96, ￿ = 0:1, and ￿ = 0:4, as in
the previous model. Also let the coe¢ cient of risk aversion be ￿ = 5, which is a su¢ ciently large
50Recall that the variance " in the power distribution is inversely related to ￿. The variance approaches zero when
￿ ! 1.
42number. With this value of risk aversion, we set ￿ = 4:05, which satis￿es the requirement ￿ < 1+￿
and implies a su¢ ciently large Gini coe¢ cient. Figure 8 (left panel) shows the relationship between
saving and growth, where the line with circles represents the standard growth without borrowing
constraints and the line with triangles the counterpart model with borrowing constraints. In both
models ￿ = 5. Figure 8 indicates that (i) high risk aversion reduces saving at all levels of growth,
other things equal (compared with Figure 2); (ii) saving and growth are still positively related,
although the positive relation is much weaker, regardless of borrowing constraints; and (iii) with
borrowing constraints, this positive relation is signi￿cantly magni￿ed. The stronger the growth,
the larger the ampli￿cation. For example, when the growth rate increases from 1% to 10% per
year, the saving rate rises from 2:5% to 5:4% in the standard model without borrowing constraints,
but under borrowing constraints the saving rate rises from 3% to 12%.
The right panel in Figure 8 shows that the marginal product of capital rises too fast without
borrowing constraints (the line with circles), while this is not the case with borrowing constraints
(the line with triangles). Hence, borrowing constraints greatly mitigate the growth e⁄ect on the
real interest rate.
To understand why the relationship between saving and growth remains positive even under high







(1 + ￿ g)
￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿
:
Di⁄erentiating this expression with respect to ￿ g yields d￿
d￿ g = ￿￿




d￿ g depends only on the numerator of this expression, which is positive if (1 + ￿ g)
￿￿1 [1 + ￿ g ￿ ￿ g￿] >
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿￿. The left-hand side of this inequality decreases with ￿ g and ￿. Suppose ￿ = 5,
￿ g = ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 0:4, and ￿ = 0:96; then the left-hand side of the above expression takes the
value 0:9317, whereas the right-hand side takes the value 0:9024. Hence, for values of ￿ within the
empirical range (i.e., ￿ 2 (0;5)), the relationship between saving and growth is positive even in a
standard growth model ￿ albeit a weak one ￿ if ￿ is 5. This positive relationship can be greatly
ampli￿ed by borrowing constraints.
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